Hard Laws Make Bad Cases - Lots of Them (The California Guest Statute) by Lascher, Edward L.
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 9 | Number 1 Article 1
1-1-1969
Hard Laws Make Bad Cases - Lots of Them (The
California Guest Statute)
Edward L. Lascher
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Edward L. Lascher, Hard Laws Make Bad Cases - Lots of Them (The California Guest Statute), 9 Santa Clara Lawyer 1 (1969).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol9/iss1/1
HARD LAWS MAKE BAD CASES-LOTS
OF THEM (THE CALIFORNIA
GUEST STATUTE)
Edward L. Lascher*
I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Twice in the space of a recent ten-month period the California
Supreme Court departed from a temporary state of insouciance
toward litigation by automobile guests against their negligent
drivers.'
In the first case, O'Donnell v. Mullaney,2 the court established
a rule which had never been enunciated in California. In reversing
both lower courts, the court held unanimously that when the guest
statute says it applies only on the highway, it applies only on the
highway and not, therefore, on private property. It also attempted to
remind the bench and the lower courts of the rhythmically-repeated
propositions that inquiry should start from the premise that a wrong
produces a remedy; that the Guest Act is an exception thereto and
thus to be narrowly and strictly construed, where possible favoring
recovery over windfall exculpation; and that the courts lack both
power and motive to invent new forms of exemption from liability
for negligence.3 Although strict construction of "highway" had not
been previously enunciated by the California court, it had been fol-
lowed in practice by a large segment of the bar with acquiescence
by most automobile insurance carriers in this state.4
* B.A., DePauw University, 1951; J.D., University of Michigan Law School,
1953; Member of the California Bar.
1 It is not to be gainsaid, of course, that the supreme court's inattention to this
field in the then-recent past may have been involuntary (or at least not readily avoid-
able) in view of the more dramatic and attention-riveting characteristics of the crim-
inal law explosion, reapportionment, open housing and the like.
2 66 Cal. 2d 994, 429 P.2d 160, 59 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1967); see for intermediate
appellate level, 55 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1967), vacated.
3 The court may have hoped that the workings of history and evolution hadbrought it to the point where a famous plaint of Andre Gide, echoed by Justice
Vallee, was no longer accurate: "'Everything has been said already; but as no one
listens, we must always begin again.' With rythmic regularity it is necessary for usto [reiterate certain fundamental propositions]. No one seems to listen." Overton v.
Vita Food Corp., 94 Cal. App. 2d 367, 370, 210 P.2d 757, 759 (1949), disapproved on
other grounds in Parsons v. Bristol Dev. Co., 62 Cal. 2d 861, 402 P.2d 839 (1965).
4 The fact that such had been the prevailing practice did not discourage a
number of insurance counsel from lodging an amicus curiae protest with the court
against their being required to continue doing that which they had always done. Guest
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In Williams v. Carr,' the second of the pair, the court at least
listened to its own injunction and invoked the strict construction
approach to resolve the question of whether a guest's ordinary con-
tributory negligence constituted a bar to wilful misconduct of a
host. In rejecting the apples v. oranges contention, the court held
that only conduct of an equally culpable character ("contributory
wilful misconduct") could be considered in bar.
Both of these decisions were of first impression in California
and both were of conspicuously consequential effect on the auto-
accident-litigation "industry," although the result in Williams was
markedly more unanticipated than O'Donnell, though no less logi-
cally compelled. Somewhat significantly, in both the court elected
the path of allowing compensation to the plaintiff (i.e., negligently
injured guest rider).6 At least equally significant, in both the court
did so after the superior court and the court of appeal had in turn
spurned the cause of the injured plaintiff-and in no uncertain
terms, at that.
7
statutes, by nature, seem to evoke strange enthusiasms and animosities among other-
wise phlegmatic lawyers and judges.
5 68 A.C. 603, 440 P.2d 505, 68 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1968); see for intermediate
appellate level, 62 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1967), vacated.
6 Even more so than in most areas of legal writing, nomenclature is all-important
in the field under consideration. However, not everyone agrees on the nomenclature.
Therefore, a glossary of terms as used in this article may be apt.
"Guest Statute" (sometimes doing business as "Guest Act"): A statute whereby
the common law right of the victim of a negligent tort to recover for his injuries
against the tortfeasor is curtailed or altered, based solely on the fact that the tort-
feasor was at the wheel of a motor vehicle in which the victim was riding. Usually
does not apply to a "passenger" infra, and usually does not apply if the tortfeasor is
intoxicated or found guilty of wilful misconduct (or in some jurisdictions, "gross
negligence," "wanton misconduct," "heedless misconduct," or whatever the local
variety of supertort may be, to say nothing of the mind-boggling "intentional acci-
dent"). In California, see CAL. VEH. CODE § 17158 (West Supp. 1967).
"Driver": The operator of a motor vehicle which in some way runs afoul of the
guest statute.
"Host": A driver who has a rider who, in turn, is a guest.
"Guest": A rider in the host's car who does not give consideration for the ride
(frequently termed a "mere guest," "gratuitous guest," "ungrateful guest," or other
epithet).
"Passenger": A rider who, because of giving "consideration," infra, is not a
guest and therefore entitled to recover for negligently inflicted injuries.
"Consideration": That which distinguishes a guest from a passenger. Beyond
this, a term which has defied rational analysis or definition for almost 40 years.
While these definitions are based primarily on accepted courtroom usage, the
courts have also sanctioned some of them as acceptable shorthand. E.g., Kruzie v.
Sanders, 23 Cal. 2d 237, 241, 143 P.2d 704, 705 (1943).
7 As discussed hereafter (§ VI. B.), it is a characteristic of this field that the
supreme court leads the way and thereafter the judiciary follows fitfully and reluc-
tantly, if at all, leaving the court of last resort to come back and do some dragging
from time to time.
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II. THESIS: THE GUEST STATUTE MERITS A LONG, HARD,
PENETRATING LOOK
It may well be that these two decisions, intrinsically, will have
a significant impact for good or ill on host-guest litigation in Cali-
fornia courts. (They both seem so eminently sensible and self-
explanatory that great scholarly outpouring does not seem indicated.
Such indications are not always accurate, however.) Analysis of
these particular flowers of the garden of host-guest law is not the
objective of this article. Someone else can count the petals and do
a qualitative analysis of the pollen; it is the writer's opinion that
there has been far more than enough of that already.
The function of this writing is an examination of the whole
weed-choked, foul-smelling patch which is known as the Guest Act,
rather than rumination on any of its component parts. The question
is not whether O'Donnell and Williams are new and beautiful
grandiflorae, noxious weeds or effective insecticides. The question
before the house is whether or not the time has come to bulldoze-
under the whole garden of the Guest Act and use it to mulch a new
era of law and reason-extending even to those who ride in auto-
mobiles on California's scenic highways.
Since it is not the writer's purpose to string out suspense or
overburden the taxed reading hours (or minutes) of the legal scholar
or practicing lawyer, he will defy convention and supply the an-
swer right now: The Guest Act should go, preferably by enlightened
legislative action recognizing its infirmities, but even if that is denied
to the citizenry then it should go by forthright judicial declaration
of unconstitutionality. For the mystery fan, that is what has come
to be known as the crunch. All that remains of this article is an
exploration of the question: Why?
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY IS AN OPEN QUESTION
Doubtless the first reaction of the guest statute apologists would
be one of pointing out the widely held assumption that constitution-
ality is long and authoritatively settled. Unarguably that assumption
is widespread, but upon examination it does not seem conspicuously
well founded.
A. Under the Federal Constitution
The validity of auto guest legislation under the Federal Con-
stitution is premised exclusively on a 1929 decision of the Supreme
1968]
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Court, Silver v. Silver.' In Silver, the Supreme Court, speaking
unanimously through Mr. Justice Stone, dealt with an attack on
the Connecticut Guest Act, which had been upheld by a split deci-
sion of that state's highest court. Noting that the record was in-
sufficient to allow true analysis of the constitutionality of the statute
(and therefore confining attention only to the opinion below), the
Supreme Court viewed with alarm the "increasing frequency of
litigation in which passengers carried gratuitously in automobiles,
often casual guests or licensees, have sought the recovery of large
sums for injuries alleged to have been due to negligent operation.""
It held that the question of curbing the "serious increase in
the evils of vexatious litigation in this class of cases . . . is for
legislative determination" and that discrimination between paying
and nonpaying riders could not necessarily be held unreasonable.'
Building upon the assumed premise (which might be challenged)
that the legislature could take the lesser step of differentiating be-
tween injured parties, it said:
In this day of almost universal highway transportation by motor
car, we cannot say that abuses originating in the multiplicity of suits
growing out of the gratuitous carriage of passengers in automobiles do
not present so conspicuous an example of what the Legislature may
regard as an evil, as to justify legislation aimed at it, even though some
abuses may not be hit. [Citations.] It is enough that the present
statute strikes at the evil where it is felt and reaches the class of cases
where it most frequently occurs.12
There is something almost quaint in both the language and
the reasoning. Certainly this case is not among the more enduring
monuments of a great American jurist. Starting with the assump-
tion that something is an evil and then reasoning to the conclusion
that because it is an evil it therefore, of course, may be remedied
by the legislature is not a generally productive method of adjudica-
tion, constitutional or otherwise; building a straw man of epithet
and thereupon tailoring a remedy to combat him was rarely a
characteristic of Mr. Justice Stone's contribution to the body of
the law. The opinion is so offhand, so full of non sequitur and ipse
dixit as to be more an embarrassment than a keystone upon which
to build-particularly into this day (40 years later) of far more
universal highway transportation and, more to the point, universal
highway slaughter.
8 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
9 Silver v. Silver, 108 Conn. 371, 143 A. 240 (1928).
10 280 U.S. at 122-23.
11 Id. at 123.
12 Id. at 123-24.
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That Silver was something of an embarrassment to the court
itself seems clearly apparent. It is a decision which has been af-
forded an atypical place in history for a Supreme Court pronounce-
ment: That of being studiously avoided. In the past quarter-cen-
tury, for example, it has been cited by the Supreme Court a grand
total of three times: Once for the proposition that the states may
regulate highway usage; 13 once (in a footnote) with the observa-
tion that the case "in no wise bear[s] on the issue now before us"; 14
and once in a per curiam memorandum of dismissal for want of a
federal question, the reason for citing Silver being obscure.'"
It has been of at least equal disinterest to the lower federal
judiciary, going virtually uncited at the court of appeals and dis-
trict court levels. In the states, however, it remains the great lode-
stone of constitutionality of guest statutes. It is submitted that the
case is not much of a foundation, and that it would be worthwhile
to examine the question of constitutionality-and to do so upon
a full and adequate record, viewing the statute under the conditions
of the mid-20th century, rather than those which were contempora-
neous with Henry Ford's Model T.
B. In California
California courts, while conspicuously willing to render grave
and scholarly consideration to disputations of supreme quiddity in
the application and interpretation of the statute, 6 have shown an
astonishingly casual and hands-off attitude toward pivotal, funda-
mental issues inherent in such cases."
In view of this tendency, there is at least some consistency in
the fact that the constitutionality of the California statute has been
far more assumed than it has been adjudicated. Both courts and
litigants seem to have given it a wide berth. The first challenge
to its constitutionality-and in large measure the only one-came
in Forsman v. Colton,' a 1933 appeal to the Third District (Sacra-
mento). In Forsman the court stated, as dictum, that the basic
13 Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 116 (1949).
14 Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 286 n.2 (1951).
15 Clarke v. Storchak, 322 U.S. 713 (1944).
16 Such as the burning social question of whether rendering advice on selection
among brands of olives is a valuable consideration. See Lundell v. Hackbarth, 226
Cal. App. 2d 609, 38 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1964).
17 Witness the fact that it took almost 40 years to decide whether contributory
negligence is a defense or if the statute applies on private property, which seems
somewhat more central to the application of the law than do the other inconse-
quential and petty issues which have been so diligently resolved.
Is 136 Cal. App. 97, 28 P.2d 429 (1933).
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statute was constitutional and held that a 1931 amendment to the
statute did not adversely affect the plaintiff's standing before the
court. 19 The plaintiff did not bother to seek a hearing by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court.
For three decades, that obiter was taken as gospel until in
1963 in Patton v. La Bree,20 the supreme court first heard words
unleashed in anger in the direction of constitutionality. Even this
tardy attack was not directed to the statute itself, but rather to a
1961 amendment which made an owner a guest in his own car no
matter what the nature of his occupancy. That appendage to the
statutory concept was found constitutional by everyone except Jus-
tice Peters and even he seems to have conceded, inexplicably, the
as-yet-uncontested question of the validity of the whole underlying
scheme; nobody on the court discussed the latter.
A year later, with that whimsical disregard for normal chron-
ology which seems to characterize this field of law, the Third Dis-
trict in Ferreira v. Barham21 got another whack at its 30-year old
decision in Forsman. Conceding that Forsman had been erected on
a defective foundation, the court held that it had been right any-
way, on the ground that the supreme court had hinted in Patton
that the statute might be constitutional and that Justice Peters had
condemned only the amendment as unconstitutional, the latter being
cited as a clincher as to constitutionality.
Finally, the last "challenge" to constitutionality occurred when
one of the divisions of the Second District Court of Appeal did a
death-defying dance on the head of a pin by citing Ferreira as
revealed demonstration of constitutionality.
22
That is the alpha and omega of the "assault" on the constitu-
tionality of the guest statute before the California appellate courts,
and the latter's "adjudication" of that validity. A cynic might well
suggest of the guest statute that with enmity like that, it scarcely
needs friendship. Certainly it is safe to state that the constitution-
ality of this bit of legislation has not exactly been tempered into a
fine steel blade by the searing fires of an adversary method or care-
ful judicial analysis of the contending arguments and weighing of
sound principles. Therefore, it seems in order to brush aside that
evanescent web of constitutional adjudication and to take a fresh
look at whether or not that old friend the guest statute happens
19 Id. at 102, 28 P.2d at 431.
20 60 Cal. 2d 606, 387 P.2d 398 (1963).
21 230 Cal. App. 2d 128, 40 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1964).
22 Stephan v. Proctor, 235 Cal. App. 2d 228, 45 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1965).
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to be compatible with a couple of even older friends, the State and
Federal Constitutions.
IV. APPLYING THE CONSTITUTIONAL TESTS
A. Restraints on the Legislative Function
It has been several centuries since an English jurist could
assert with a straight face that "An act of Parliament can do no
wrong"-even adding, ironically, "though it may do several things
that look pretty odd.' 23 But it remains true that the legislature is
the body best suited to the eradication of pernicious statutes and
the ballot box is the best stimulus to achieving that end.
There is a presumption of validity which surrounds a statute.
Indeed, a whole bromidic liturgy (which became trite in part be-
cause it was true) springs readily to mind, and to the judicial tongue
and pen, whenever a litigant has the bad manners to challenge a
statute, and particularly one that has been around for a while.24
Even as against constitutional attack, broad legislative discretion
is zealously recognized, and judicial review starts from the pre-
sumption that the lawmakers were in fact discreet.
However, ours is a constitutional government, and not one of
parliamentary paramountcy. Therefore, the presumption of validity
and discretion is only a rebuttable one,25 and, as is true of other
rebuttable presumptions, once it is dispelled, there's nothing left
of it.26
The two pertinent constitutions invalidate a statute, even
though the legislature has regularly adopted it-and even though
it has been around a while-if, among other things, it denies equal
protection of the laws to any person, grants a special privilege or
immunity to any citizen or class of citizens which is not granted
23 City of London v. Wood, 12 Mod. 669, 687-88, 88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1601 (1701).
24 See, e.g., Patton v. LaBree, 60 Cal. 2d 606, 387 P.2d 398 (1963) ; Ferreira v.
Barham, 230 Cal. App. 2d 128, 40 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1964).
25 Even the California Legislature has recently supplied an illustration of that
fact. In 1935, the legislature amended the California Code of Civil Procedure to pro-
vide that a party litigant could not substitute his own attorney out of the case, if
the attorney was on a contingent fee, unless he first obtained a drumhead adjudication
by the court as to the amount of the fee to which the attorney was entitled. CAL.
CODE CiV. PROC. § 284(2) (West 1954). Not too surprisingly, this was held uncon-
stitutional in Echlin v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 2d 368, 90 P.2d 63 (1939). After a
mere 28 years during which this unconstitutional provision remained on the books
to confuse and occasionally trip an unwary lawyer or judge, the legislature decided to
go along with the Constitution and deleted the amendment. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §
284(2) (West Supp. 1967). However fine they grind, the mills of the legislature at
least grind abundantly slow.
26 CAL. EviD. CODE § 604 (West 1966).
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to all citizens, or, as a general law, fails to have a uniform opera-
tion.27 Even here, however, it must be conceded that these constitu-
tional mandates do not prohibit legislative classification, nor re-
quire every statute to affect every person in the same way. But,
once again, there is a Newtonian reaction. The mere fact that the
legislature says that the statute classifies (rather than discriminates)
does not end the inquiry, which depends on the substance more
than the label,2" nor does the mere fact that everyone within a
specific class happens to be treated the same way settle the matter.
If a classification is "palpably unreasonable" or without "rea-
sonable relation to a proper legislative objective", the presumption
is overcome, the legislature has departed from the province of its
discretion, and the statute is invalid.29
Judicial inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause does not end
with a showing of equal application among the members of the class
defined by the legislation. The courts must reach and determine the
question whether the classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable
in light of its purpose .. ..
In a nutshell, the equal protection clause requires rationality."'
In determining whether or not rationality is present, the courts
give the legislature the benefit of the doubt-but not unqualified
benefit. For example, the legislature may confer special privileges,
but: "Once the reason for conferring a special privilege ends, the
privilege must end."32 Similarly, the burden of a statute may fall
upon a particular class, but only if there is a reasonable distinction
between that group and the groups excluded from the class, and the
27 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. 1 §§ 11, 21. For ease of refer-
ence, all three of these constitutional provisions will be lumped under the shorthand
title of "equal protection." Even the constitutional purists who might be anguished at
such indiscriminate lumping together are hard put to identify the realistic difference
among the three, particularly when applied to the testing of a statute such as the
guest statute. Even the courts seem to treat them as largely interchangeable.
28 Looff v. City of Long Beach, 153 Cal. App. 2d 174, 181-82, 314 P.2d 518, 524
(1957). The author of the Looff opinion, Justice Fourt, is perhaps California's most
outspoken critic of judicial willingness to invalidate acts of the legislature. He is also,
however, one of the most outspoken spokesmen for the proposition (perhaps not as
self-evident as it should be) that rationality plays a role in the legal method. There
may be a lesson in the confluence of these two factors with the result that the normal
reluctance to intervene ran second to a reaction to irrationality.
29 Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners, 57 Cal. 2d 228, 233, 368 P.2d
101, 103 (1962); County of Los Angeles v. Southern California Tel. Co., 32 Cal. 2d
378, 392, 196 P.2d 773, 782 (1948).
30 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
31 Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-09 (1966).
32 In re Norwalk Call, 62 Cal. 2d 185, 192, 397 P.2d 426, 431 (1964) (dissenting
opinion); cf. CAL. CIv. COD § 3510 (West 1954): "When the reason of a rule ceases,
so should the rule itself."
[Vol. 9
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distinction has some relationship to the purpose for which the stat-
ute is designed. 33
Of course, one great saving clause for otherwise unredeemable
statutes is the oft-stated proposition that the legislature need not
attempt to stamp out every evil with a single statute; the legisla-
tion need only tend reasonably to hit an existing evil (or a part
thereof) at which it aims.84 The problem under this head is the
lack of any specification as to just what was the target of the legis-
lature's aim. Until the target is ascertained, it is conspicuously
difficult to determine whether the marksman is shooting at it or
away from it. This article will shortly consider the possible targets
so that it may be ascertained whether or not the statutory classi-
fications are approaching the bull's-eye.3 5
That target evaluation (Section V, infra), however, must also
be considered against the backdrop of a wise, if seldom heeded,
admonition of the Supreme Court to the effect that equal protection
requires particularly close scrutiny of a legislative discrimination
where it is "of an unusual character;" the presence of such unusual
characteristics in legislation "suggest[s] careful consideration to
determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional provi-
sio n . ,,76
If there is one conclusion which it is safe to draw concerning
the guest statute (and there may well be more than one), it is that
such legislation is unusual in the acme.3 7
B. Guest Statutes Fail the Test of Reason and Rationality
Weighed by these standards of logic and rationality, automo-
bile-guest legislation has been found wanting-in many ways, places
33 Department of Mental Hygiene v. McGilvery, 50 Cal. 2d 742, 754, 329 P.2d
689, 695 (1958).
84 E.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) ; Queenside Realty Co.
v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80, 84 (1946) ; O'Donnell v. Mullaney, 66 Cal. 2d 994, 999, 429 P.2d
160, 163 (1967).
35 Ex-infantry riflemen with long memories may, one suspects, think more in
terms of "Maggie's drawers."
36 Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 464 (1957); Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37-38 (1928).
87 It is unarguable, of course, that there are a lot of other bizarre statutes on
the books. A glance through such "Alice in Wonderland" subject matters as asparagus
labeling, the adoption of an official nickname (the contradiction in terms to end all
contradictions), and other such outpourings of the last session of the California
Legislature would soon give the comeuppance to any claim that the Guest Act is
alone on its pinnacle of unreason. However, most such pixilated statutes are of
highly specialized application and transitory duration. In the heavyweight division,
the guest statute has won the accolade of absurdity as unchallenged champion for
more than a generation.
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and disciplines. It is unreason personified and even in an older,
more conservative era, a not particularly sociologically-oriented
judge still said: "Nothing is law which is not reason.""8
Such legislation, which is "the result of persistent and effective
lobbying on the part of liability insurance companies" 9 who were
"represented by well-organized, well financed and effective lobby-
ists, while the unorganized and unknown injured persons of the
future had no lobbies or agents at all",4° is not peculiar to California.
Some 27 states have adopted this curious form of statute.41 Con-
necticut enjoys the dubious distinction of leading the pack in several
ways: It was the first to adopt a guest statute and it was that
state's statute which evoked the first, last and only putative "adjudi-
cation" of constitutionality.42 It was also the first to repeal the
statute, legislatively.
This legally complex and far-reaching enactment aimed at hitch-
hikers was drafted by non-lawyers; due to an unprecedented fluke it
was not even referred to or studied by the legislative judiciary com-
mittee, composed of lawyers, most of whom would probably have
opposed the measure. After ten years Connecticut repealed the statute,
in spite of the governor's veto, but not before many other states had
passed similar laws.43
Such statutes were, however, peculiar to a particular moment
in time (at least as the law measures things). All were enacted
between 1927 and 1939 and are, therefore, the product of an era
which dawned while the twenties were still roaring and the stock
market still soaring, and while "depression" referred primarily to a
state of mind. Age, of course, is no producer of opprobrium in the
general experience of the law, but where the subject is intertwined
with technology, the passage of time may have significance. Any
doubt that the subject matter of guest legislation has undergone
some significant changes should be dispelled by comparing a 1927
LaSalle or a 1939 Hudson with a 1969 Toronado, GTO or Chap-
paral-or, for that matter, by comparing the old El Camino Real
with the Nimitz Freeway or Los Angeles' four-level interchange.
Even the general purpose of such statutes as phrased by
the leading treatise in' the field has a sort of antedeluvian ring
to it: "[Guest statutes]' were designed to relieve the harshness
38 Powell, J., Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Lord Raymond 909, 911 (1703).
39 W. PROSSER, TORTS § 34, at 190-91 (3d ed. 1964) (footnote omitted).
40 Tipton, Florida's Automobile Guest Statute, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 287, 288 (1958),
41 Id. at 288; see Am. JUR. 2d Desk Book Doc. 123, at 304-05 (1962),
42 See § III. A., supra and accompanying authorities.
4 Tipton, supra note 40, at 288 (footnotes omitted?..
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of the common law rule which requires the exercise of ordinary
care .... 44
In the seventh decade of the twentieth century, it is not gen-
erally regarded as unduly "harsh" to require a citizen to make
restitution for the harms that he inflicts on others-even those
inflicted by means of mere negligence.
1. Guest Legislation is Irrational in Theory. If there is any
other field of legislation which is more unanimously and univer-
sally condemned than the guest statutes, it certainly does not spring
readily to mind. As Dean Prosser points out:
The typical guest act case is that of the driver who offers his
friend a lift to the office or invites him out to dinner, negligently
drives him into a collision and fractures his skull-after which the
driver and his insurance company take refuge in the statute, step out
of the picture, and leave the guest to bear his own loss. If this is good
social policy, it at least appears under a novel front.45
The condemnation has not been peculiar to the groves of
academe. The judiciary has been almost equally vocal in denounc-
ing the role into which the legislation has forced the courts. (One
cannot help wishing, however, that there had been a little more
realistic scrutiny-and consequent action-to accompany the de-
nunciations.) Perhaps the most eloquent condemnation 46 comes
from the Supreme Court of Michigan,47 in the course of a decision
noting the unabated need to wrestle with the statute, its history,
the scholarly criticism thereof, and the vain nature of the struggle
to harmonize it with sound legal principles.
Our difficulties with the interpretation of this act arise from an
irreconcilable conflict between the provisions of the act and the prin-
44 5 D. BrAsHY=D, AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 211.5, at 109 (3d ed.
1966).
45 W. PROSSER, TORTS § 34, at 191 (3d ed. 1964) (footnote omitted). The good
Dean's antagonism to the statutes is not some personal idiosyncracy; he is merely-
and typically-quotable on the subject. Professors Harper and James term the field "a
welter of words" which has "bred confusion and conflict," acting "in derogation of the
common law [and cutting] athwart a vital trend in the common law." 2 F. HARPER
AND F. JAMES, TORTS, 953, 958, 961 (1956).
Indeed, as to almost any jurisdiction which has (1) a guest statute and (2) a
university which publishes a law review, it is a Safe bet that somewhere there is a
treatise apostrophising the statute--in terms of varying fervor (and even varying hu-
mor), but unvarying condemnation.
46 It is a source of no little regret and chagrin to the writer-an unashamed
chauvinist when it comes to the California judiciary-that the California reports are
singularly devoid of demurrers, to say nothing of denunciations-eloquent or otherwise.
,4t Stevens v. Stevens, 355 14ih. 363, 94 N.W.2d 858 (1959).
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ciples and traditions of the common law, the customs and convictions
of our people. Thus, our law has long held that one who undertakes
to act must act with a due regard for the safety of others. The fact that
no money changes hands is not determinative of this duty or of lia-
bility. . . . The shining thread traceable through the tapestry of these
decisions is well known to all of us, the value placed by our people
upon human life and human safety. The thought requires no elabora-
tion. Our pen can add nothing to its lustre. There it stands, crystal
clear, illumined by its own intrinsic radiance.
Hand in hand with this rubric of the common law runs another:
the fulfillment of trust imposed. Rightly or wrongly, our law has
prided itself that those who put their faith in another shall not suffer
unrecompensed harm through that other's falsity or lack of care. It
has been our boast that when one entrusts another with life or prop-
erty relying upon a relationship of trust and confidence, rather than
the weapons and guarantees of the business world, a performance of
duty the most exacting will be demanded, a conformity not with the
arm's length standards of the market but rather the infinitely nicer
standards of the hearth and the heart. The authorities we need not cite.
The guest passenger acts changed all of this. The friends of the
driver, his family, those to whom he stands in the closest relationship
of faith, and trust, and confidence, must suffer injury at his hands
without recompense, solaced only by the thought that, after all, the
skull was cracked by a friendly hand. His legal status, this invited
guest, is no better than that of a trespasser. The hospital bill, the loss
from the long illness, all arising from the wrong of another and with-
out fault on the part of the victim, must be shouldered without the
aid of him who did the wrong. Why? Because the relationship between
them was one of trust and friendship. No money had changed hands.
If, however, not the neighbor himself is carried to town, but rather his
livestock to the slaughterhouse, many modern courts will permit full
recovery for injury to the unfortunate animal through failure to use
reasonable care for its safety. Is this one answer of an enlightened
people to the hallowed question: 'How much then is a man better than
a sheep?' 48
2. Guest Legislation Has Proved Irrational in Practice.
Scholarly theorizing is not necessarily always the best or even the
last word; the proof of a statute may be in the applying. As ap-
plied, the guest statute has certainly had some substantial and con-
spicuous effects. From the standpoint of its specific impact on the
California judicial machinery it is examined in some greater detail
hereafter.49
48 Id. at -, 94 N.W,2d at 862 (footnote omitted). The courts of at least one
jurisdiction dissent in part both from the New Testament (Matt: 12:11, 12) and from
the Michigan reliance thereon, asserting that the question of whether a man is better
than a sheep is for the legislature to decide. Mitzel v. Hauck, - S.D. -, 105
N.W.2d 378, 382 (1960).
Such is the persuasive power of guest legislation that Holy Writ, Magna Charta,
the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and other monuments to the rights
of ien must play second fiddle to a statutory preference for sheep.
49 See § VI, infra.
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At this juncture, the question is: Even though the statute seems
logically indefensible, has it worked out logically in practice?
Answer: NO.
The first thing which strikes one about guest legislation is that
the division of jurisdictions provides a controlled experiment, almost
unparalleled, in which comparative analysis (or, perhaps, differ-
ential diagnosis) is so readily available. The second striking feature
is that the legislation appears to have no effect except that of mis-
chief-making.
The jurisdictions which have adopted guest statutes5O vary from
the nation's most populous state (our own California) and the
fourth most populous (Texas), to the nation's second and third least
populous (Wyoming and Vermont). On the other hand, 24 jurisdic-
tions5' struggle along without statutory gratitude (or whatever the
excuse is) and these include the second and third most populous
states (New York and Pennsylvania) as well as the least populous
(Alaska). Thus, there is an attractive symmetry. In fact, there is
more symmetry than sense.
Among other things, there is no showing extant to justify the
conclusion that North Dakota passengers, for example, are one
scintilla more grateful for favors than are their neighbors in Min-
nesota, despite the fact that drivers in the Land of the Thousand
Lakes expose their hands to biting, unprotected,5" while those in
North Dakota do not. On the other hand, nobody has advanced any
very convincing claim that host-guest litigation in the courts of
Wisconsin-where there is no legislative safeguard against perjury,
collusion, et al.5 is any more pristine pure and unblemished than
it is in the circuit courts of Mayor Daley's Cook County just to
the south, where there is "protection" against "collusion" and the
other myriad of evils which holding a tortfeasor responsible for his
torts entails.
Specifically, there appears to be no correlation between exist-
ence or nonexistence of a guest statute and level of automotive
liability insurance premium (nor, for that matter, with the level of
underwriting profit-a perhaps less compelling consideration, but
50 Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. See note 39 supra.
51 Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
52 See § V. A. infra.
5 See § V. B. infra.
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one which is significant by its absence). The urban or rural char-
acter of a state, the size and density of its population (human and
automotive), the existence of large route concentrations and the
nature and condition of its highways are the factors which determine
a state's insurance premium level. If those add up to a high premium
level, the premium remains high with absolutely no reference to what
the legislature does about a guest statute.54
The pluperfect illustration of the statute in actual operation
may be gleaned from a perhaps-hypothetical case.55
Husband and Wife enter the family car in the drive-
way for the purpose of driving to the post office and mail-
ing a birthday card.5 If Husband backs negligently down
the driveway and hits a lamp post before reaching the
street, injuring Wife, Wife can recover against Husband.
No danger of collusion there and no worry about ingrati-
tude. If, however, he makes it to the street and backs into
a car parked at the opposite curb, the guest statute applies
and he and his insurance company have to be protected
from Wife's ingratitude.57
If he successfully negotiates that street, and reaches
the post office, where he double parks, with Wife getting
out of the car to run across the street and mail the card, he
is liable for his ordinary negligence in failing to warn her if
he sees that she is running into the stream of traffic, where
she is hit by another car. If, however, she makes it back
and he pulls out into the stream of traffic, he is not liable
for ordinary negligence.
Of course, it should be remembered that all of this
might be academic if Wife were going along to advise on
Christmas shopping or selection of olives, in which case
it would possibly be a business trip; but not if the couple
were on their way to get married, which is a mere courtesy
of the road.
From all of this, it appears that at least a prima facie showing
54 Tipton, supra note 40, at 305-06.
55 But undoubtedly one which has occurred somewhere, such being the nature
of guest litigation.
G6 It must be a greeting card, and not a letter with any possible business con-
notation; moreover, it should not even be a greeting card directed to anyone who
might possibly be of any service to the couple, or they might get into the realm of
compensation or mutual benefit or such.
57 Presumably, however, the insurance company does not need protection against
Husband's deciding that there was indeed a business purpose to the trip.
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is made that the statute falls somewhat below the constitutional
norms of rationality, legitimate objective and reasonable means.
It remains to be seen, however, whether the apologists of the statute
are able to rehabilitate it effectively.
V. THE JUSTIFICATIONS GIVEN IN SUPPORT OF THE
STATUTE Do NOT WITHSTAND SCRUTINY
In common with other states, the California courts have set
forth (with more clarity than logical support) two rationales which
are the exclusive justification for the statute-two targets at which
the legislature is supposedly shooting." Typically, these words were
put in the mouth of the legislature; the two chambers in Sacramento
have never been so bold as to assay a rationalization of that which
they have wrought. Unlike the courts in most states, the California
courts have even gone so far as to make clear the order of impor-
tance of these two objectives. They are, in that order of importance:
1. Protecting the negligent driver against the evil of ingrati-
tude on the part of his victim; 59 and
2. Protecting against that same negligent driver, whose pre-
sumed intent is to conspire with his victim to make sure
that victim does recover compensation.6"
A. The Two Objectives Appear Directly Contradictory
There is more than a little bit of logical difficulty in reconciling
the notion that the driver needs protection against ungrateful law-
suits with the idea that he is likely to be a prime mover in bringing
about those lawsuits. The unspoken truth of the matter, of course,
is that the nasty phrase "insurance company" must be read into
that equation somewhere or other. Even the presence of insurance,
however, does not completely obviate the contradictory nature of
these pious propositions.
58 Some states have added a third justification, that of keeping the insurance
policy-fund intact and available for the benefit of those riding in cars other than the
host-guest vehicle (blithely but unwarrantedly assuming that all guest litigation
stems out of multi-car collisions). See, e.g., Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 124, 209
N.E.2d 792, 794, 262 N.Y.S. 463, 466 (1965). Mercifully, the California courts have
spared our corpus juris that particular solecism.
59 Martinez v. Southern Pac. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 244, 253, 288 P.2d 868, 872 (1955);
Kruzie v. Sanders, 23 Cal. 2d 237, 242, 143 P.2d 704, 706 (1943) ; Sand v. Mahnan,
248 Cal. App. 2d 679, 683, 56 Cal. Rptr. 691, 696 (1967) ; Stephan v. Proctor, 235
Cal. App. 2d 228, 230, 45 Cal. Rptr. 124, 125 (1965); Bowman v. Collins, 181 Cal.
App. 2d 807, 814, 5 Cal. Rptr. 776, 780 (1965).
60 Sand v. Mahnan, 248 Cal. App. 2d 679, 683, 56 Cal. Rptr. 691, 696 (1967);
Stephan v. Proctor, 235 Cal. App. 2d 228, 230, 45 Cal. Rptr. 124, 125 (1965).
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If the objective is to protect the driver against the consequences
of base ingratitude on the part of the guest whom he maims (even
assuming that this is a legitimate concern of the sovereign), then
the reason ceases to exist once that driver is insured, since he ordi-
narily is no longer afflicted by any ingratitude. He is not the victim
of this fall from virtue; his insurance company is, and the insur-
ance company did not extend the courtesy (and earn the gratitude)
in the first place. If, on the other hand, the objective is not to protect
the driver (by hypothesis a lying, conniving, collusive ne'er-do-well
who merits the back of the law's hand), but rather to protect
against him, then the reason for the statute would fail in any case
where the host was uninsured."'
As it stands, however, the courts are in the somewhat contor-
tionist posture of saying that the same statute is designed to pro-
tect a virtuous, protection-deserving citizen and at the same time
to protect against a villainous, evil citizen, the trouble being that
it is the same citizen. Old adages about blowing hot and cold on the
same transaction, speaking with forked tongues and the like come
readily to mind. Ingratitude, it is submitted, is not the only human
failing and in the legal method it may even be a failing of less con-
sequence than hypocrisy. Particularly so when that hypocrisy is
practiced in the temples of the law.
The vice of these justifications for the statute, however, is not
merely that they cancel each other out; even viewed independently,
they are irrational rationales.
B. Viewed Separately, the "Gratitude" Rationale is Unavailing
The rationale which the California courts have said to be the
most important 62 is that of stamping out "the proverbial ingratitude
of the dog that bites the hand that feeds him,"" i.e., the friend,
neighbor, or family member who is ungrateful enough to want to be
compensated when his driver-host maims him. In other somewhat-
victorian terms, the courts apostrophize the passenger as a "mere
invited guest" whose claimed right to be made whole offends every
natural feeling of justice."
61 One may suspect that there are those among that which Dean Prosser calls
the insurance lobby who would shrug their shoulders and say that was okay with
them: Let the ungrateful wretch who does not pay premiums stew in his own juice.
There may be a lesson here, concerning the overall morality of the Guest Act.
62 Stephan v. Proctor, 235 Cal. App. 2d 228, 230, 45 Cal. Rptr. 124, 125 (1965).
63 Crawford v. Foster, 110 Cal. App. 81, 87, 293 P. 841, 843 (1930).
64 Id.; cj., Kudrna v. Adamski, 188 Ore. 396, 216 P.2d 262, 263 (1950) ; Annot.,
16 A.L.R.2d 1301 (1951).
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As if this failure of the plaintiff to display full measure of the
puritan virtue of gratitude were not enough, it is customarily as-
sumed that he is a hitchhiker. Needless to say, the concept of a
hitchhiker-often conjured up as a hippie, yippie, or the like-as
a successful plaintiff is a powerful argument in favor of protecting
auto owners. However, it seems that even if hitchhiking was as
prevalent a transportational norm as that in the depression thirties,
it has long since ceased to be such in the affluent sixties.65 For that
matter, one wonders whether the hitchhiker-plaintiff was ever
more than a scapegoat or rationalization for a statute whose honest
motivation was quite different.60 No California decision involving
a hitchhiker has been discovered. Nationally, Dean Prosser points
out: "In legislative hearings there is frequent mention of the hitch-
hiker, who gets little sympathy. The writer once found a hitch-hiker
case, but has mislaid it. He has been unable to find another."67
But whoever that churlishly-ungrateful wretch who seeks to re-
cover for "mere ordinary negligence" may be, and whatever the
relationship that got him into that position to suffer from his bene-
factor's tort, it still seems that the primary purpose of stamping out
ingratitude is a conspicuously illegitimate one. Phrased baldly, it is
none of the state's business what kind of virtuous emotions the citi-
zenry feels or fails to feel. Far be it from the writer to decry moral-
ity or claim that it has no relationship to the law. The point, how-
ever, is that a man is free to be as immoral as he desires and it is
none of the legislature's business what his state of mind may be.
"The object of the law is not to punish sins,"6 but "[t] he lawmaker
must have in mind . . . practical limitations and must not suppose
that he can bring about an ideal moral order by law if only he can hit
upon the appropriate moral principles and develop them properly
by legislation." 69
The cry of sumptuary legislation may be somewhat less persua-
sive than it was in the early days of the New Deal, but there is still
some question as to the power of any branch of government to im-
pose legal consequences upon the subjective workings of the human
mind or human heart.
65 Tipton, supra note 40, at 300.
66 Shortly after the adoption of the California Guest Statute (a point in time
which involves some circumstantial probabilities of trustworthiness), California com-
mentators were quite candidly admitting that the true motivation of the statute was
to benefit liability insurance companies-even defending it on that ground-other
rationalizations being termed mere windowdressing. Comment, 18 CALn. L. REv.
184, 194 (1930).
67 W. PROSSER, TORTS § 34, at 191 n.83 (3d ed. 1964).
68 Holmes, J., in Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 20, 48 N.E. 770,
770 (1897).
69 11 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 254 (1959).
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A statute making it a penal offense, subject to punishment as a
felony (or even a misdemeanor) for one person to entertain ingrati-
tude toward another person might well encounter some noticeable
constitutional objections. Is it any more permissible for the legisla-
ture to aim at stamping out ingratitude by licensing benefactors to
maim the guilty parties? 70
Moreover, if it is a legitimate function of the sovereign to pre-
vent the making of any reparations to a person whose breast harbors
ingratitude, how is it that the state sanctions the enjoyment of medi-
cal pay benefits by ingrates? It is a matter of common knowledge
that the vast majority of auto liability policies issued in California
contain such provisions, by which the injured party is entitled to
restitution for medical expenses-even if the host is not guilty of
any wrong.71
If there is, indeed, a public interest so strong as to justify pro-
hibiting restitution to a guest who has been the victim of a wrong,
how can it conceivably be rational to allow him to recover when
there is no wrong? For that matter, why is ingratitude tolerated
when it relates to medical bills but not when it relates to wrongful
death? Is a guest any less ungrateful if he seeks reimbursement
from his generous host for broken glasses than when he seeks reim-
bursement for the lifetime effects of blindness? There are strange
things wrought in the name of moral indignation over ingratitude.
Finally, the folly of the legislated-gratitude approach is illus-
trated by a consideration of the area of conflict of laws. For example,
in a jurisdiction which applies the rigid "place of the wrong" test
for choice of law, a California host-driver needs protection against
ingratitude when he is on one side of the Colorado River but when
he crosses to Arizona, gratitude becomes a matter of morality and
not statute. On the other hand, applying the "grouping-of-contacts"
test,72 a California host driving through Arizona might be held en-
titled to statutory gratitude whereas his opposite number in the
next car who happens to be a Minnesota resident would not-and
70 Query: Why not, then, banish from use of the public libraries anyone who
fails to express sufficient gratitude for its many beneficent services? Or prohibit the
use of the United States mail by any of the not-insubstantial number of citizens who
give vocal expression to their complaints concerning the quality of service they receive?
And above all, should not the doors of the superior courts be closed to any litigant
(or, better still, lawyer) who has the ingratitude to appeal one of its decisions? Of
course, the legislature is not required to stamp out all evil manifestations of ingratitude
in a single statute. But what would be the result if the lawmakers, emboldened by a
generation of success in stamping out vehicular ingratitude, decided to expand the
cure to such other manifestations.
71 CAL. INS. CODE § 108(b) (West Supp. 1967).
72 Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727 (1967).
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both of them are in Arizonal The gratitude argument, then, only
serves to complicate and obfuscate an already complicated, obfus-
cated and irrational patchwork.73
C. Viewed Separately, the "Collusion" Rationale is Unavailing
Thus, it appears that the statute cannot be rehabilitated on the
basis so solemnly proclaimed as primary. It is necessary, therefore,
to fire and fall back to the secondary policy. That has been suc-
cinctly stated by one of the courts of appeal: "A secondary policy,
of course, is to prevent collusive suits between friends where the
driver admits negligence in order to shift the burden to his insurance
carrier. ' 174
That solecism has been iterated and reiterated so often that it
has come to have a veneer of superficial reason. It does not stand
scrutiny too well, however.
1. It Is a Conspicuously Selective and Ineffectual Way to
Prevent Collusion. Disregarding the apparently dim view that its
proponents take of the honesty of their fellow citizens75 and the
considerable tendency of human nature to revolt at charging oneself
with wrongdoing,76 it involves a rather tunnel-visioned view of what
is effective collusion. Presumably the theory is that counsel for the
injured guest will put the defendant host on the stand and propound
to him the following question:
Will you please tell the court and jury whether or not you exer-
cised the care of the reasonably prudent man under the same or similar
circumstances, actuated by those considerations which normally regu-
late the conduct of human affairs; that is to say, did you do some-
thing which the reasonably prudent man would not do or fail to do
something which the reasonably prudent person would do? 77
Assuming that such a question, or something like it, would
withstand objection, the whole venture still seems a little lacking in
73 See Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws-Towards a Theory
of Enterprise Liability Under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws": 1, 69 YALE L. J.
595, 599, 600 (1960).
74 Stephan v. Proctor, 235 Cal. App. 2d 228, 230, 45 Cal. Rptr. 124, 125 (1965).
75 And their willingness to subject themselves to felony prosecution for insurance
fraud and perjury: CAL. INS. CODE § 556 (West 1955); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 118,
118(a) (West 1955).
76 It is unarguable that the vast majority of non-guest auto accident litigation
involves insured defendants. It is also less than a bizarre phenomenon for the defend-
ant and the plaintiff in a two-car (non-guest) accident case to be acquainted or even
friendly, particularly in the smaller communities. There has been no recognizable
trend in such cases, however, for defendants to engage in wholesale perjury and col-
lusion merely because there was insurance.
77 Cf., 1 CAL. JUR. INST. Civ. 4th, No. 101 (1956).
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forensic effect. One must entertain a low opinion of the common
sense of a juror to assume that twelve of the litigant's peers would
fail to see through this or be particularly impressed by such a "con-
fession." Even apart from rebuttal, it seems realistic to assume that
such an approach might have as much of a boomerang effect in favor
of the insurance company as anything.
But even more to the point, why is it that everyone assumes
that the only form of collusion known to mankind is that of "admit-
ting negligence?" Given the hypothesis of a defendant hell-bent to
commit fraud and perjury in favor of the plaintiff, it seems every bit
as easy to admit wilful misconduct or intoxication. And isn't it even
easier to take care of the whole problem by fabricating "considera-
tion," whereupon everyone can forget about collusion-presum-
ably. 7
8
2. Broad, Effective Preventives Exist In Other Statutes.
Among other things, the guest statute is superfluous if it is premised
on a legislative attempt to stamp out fraud against insurance com-
panies. The legislature has already dealt with that by making such
practice felonious.79 Indeed, that statutory provision was already
law (although in a different code) at the time the Guest Act was
adopted." Frauds which have been committed have been redressed
under that statute. It has had fairly frequent application: enough to
demonstrate that it is an effective means of dealing with insurance
fraud, while not enough to demonstrate the wholesale prevalence of
fraud in the citizenry which would justify stamping out legitimate
claims as a countermeasure to endemic fraud. 81
78 Instead of the colloquy hypothesized above, there is the following: "Q. Why
did you make the trip, Mr. Driver? A. Well, Joe and I negotiated for a while before
we decided to go to the bar, and I tried to persuade him to go along so that he could
give me the benefit of his expertise on beer selection. In fact, we decided, after some
negotiation, that he would offer to go with me and select a brand if I would accept
by my conduct in transporting him. I accepted his offer."
79 "It is unlawful to:
(a) Present or cause to be presented any false or fraudulent claim for the pay-
ment of a loss under a contract of insurance.
(b) Prepare, make, or subscribe any writing, with intent to present or use the
same, or to allow it to be presented or used in support of any such claim.
Every person who violates any provision of this section is punishable by imprison-
ment in the State prison not exceeding three years, or by fine not exceeding one
thousand dollars, or by both." CAL. INS. CODE § 556 (West 1955).
80 CAL. PENAL CODE § 549, repealed Stats. 1935, ch. 145 § 13002.
81 E.g., Scofield v. State Bar, 62 Cal. 2d 624, 401 P.2d 217 (1965); People v.
Kanan, 208 Cal. App. 2d 635, 25 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1962) ; People v. Loomis, 207 Cal.
App. 2d 229, 24 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1962) ; People v. Benson, 206 Cal. App. 2d 519, 23
Cal. Rptr. 908 (1962) (something of a vintage year for insurance fraud, evidently);
People v. Reed, 190 Cal. App. 2d 344, 11 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1961) ; People v. Wirth, 186
Cal. App. 2d 68, 8 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1960); People v. Zelver, 135 Cal. App. 2d 226,
287 P.2d 183 (1955) ; People v. Grossman, 28 Cal. App. 2d 193, 82 P.2d 76 (1938).
Compare Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 375 P.2d
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In contrast to this admirable means of dealing with criminals
by prosecuting them for crime (a manner of sovereign action which
has a good deal to commend itself), the guest statute appears to have
been a dismal failure. Despite its much more general application, the
writer has failed to discover a single case involving the guest statute
in which the presence of collusion has even been suggested. The guest
statute approach of dealing with possible criminality by confiscating
everyone's common law rights of action, then, is not only morally
and theoretically indefensible; it does not seem to work.
True, a statute is not unconstitutional merely because it is inef-
fectual.82 But where the legislature has prescribed a means of dealing
with a particular form of antisocial behavior, and a punishment to
be imposed upon the perpetrators of that behavior, it is submitted
that the realm of unconstitutionality is reached by superadding a
punishment upon the entire citizenry-those subject to the felony
provisions and those innocent-in an effort to make sure that pres-
ently innocent citizens do not become guilty. This smacks of both
double punishment and bill of attainder-admittedly not in their
literal sense, but in their underlying philosophy and rationale.
3. The Notion That Judicial Relief Is To Be Withheld Be-
cause of Possibility of Wrongdoing Is Widely Discredited. More-
over, the mere fact that wrongdoing may be possible in connection
with certain types of litigation is not often thought to be justifica-
tion for stamping out legitimate claims in that field.
Indubitably, juries and trial courts, constantly called upon to dis-
tinguish the frivolous from the substantial and the fraudulent from
the meritorious, reach some erroneous results. But such fallibility, in-
herent in the judicial process, offers no reason for substituting for
the case-by-case resolution of causes an artificial and indefensible
barrier .... The mere assertion that fraud is possible, "a possibility
that exists to some degree in all cases" . . . does not prove a present
necessity to abandon the neutral principles of foreseeability, proximate
cause and consequential injury that generally govern tort law ...
[W]e cannot let the difficulties of adjudication frustrate the principle
that there be a remedy for every substantial wrong.8 3
So saying, the California Supreme Court held that the mere
possibility of fraud and collusion was no justification for flatly re-
jecting claims for negligently inflicted emotional trauma. The same
has been said of the possibility of fraud and collusion in actions
between members of the same household; husband versus wife,
439 (1962), with Teitelbaum v. Borders, 206 Cal. App. 2d 634, 23 Cal. Rptr. 868(1962) and People v. Teitelbaum, 163 Cal. App. 2d 184, 329 P.2d 157 (1958).
82 If it were, havoc would be wreaked in the fabric of the law.
88 Dillon v. Legg, 68 A.C. 766, 775, 776, 777, 441 P.2d 912, 918, 919 (1968).
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parent versus child.84 The possibility of fraud or collusion, we are
told in those contexts, does not justify closing the courtroom door to
honest claims. (I.e., any such arbitrary withholding of judicial rem-
edy would be unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional.) The
same courts which have sounded those clarion notes, however, have
added a caveat: unless the potential conspirators are driving and
riding in an automobile. The Constitution, it seems, does not apply
on the highways."5
Furthermore, assuming the objective of stamping out the prac-
tice of collusion by destroying every possibility thereof, then it must
be remembered that the objective must be approached in a manner
which does not deny equal protection or impose special burdens on
specific classes. It must be approached, in short, in a legitimate
fashion. How, then, can the legislature single out only one narrow
class-those citizens riding in autmobiles on the public highways
without giving consideration-as the only group which will feel the
lash of the anti-collusion drive? Is there any rational basis for
segregating that particular coterie of potential conspirators from
the entire mass which the legislature and the courts seem to see
lurking under the bed?
4. The Concept of Protecting Insurers Against Loss Is Con-
tradictory of the Legal Preference for Insurance. Finally, if there is
a truly legitimate objective to stamp out collusion against automobile
liability insurance companies, how can that objective possibly be
reconciled with the financial responsibility laws 6 which make lia-
bility insurance virtually mandatory? According to this theory, with
one hand the legislature is forcing the motorist to carry (and pay
for) insurance, while at the same time it is guarding against the
policyholder receiving the protection for which he pays. One or the
other seems unreasonable-and the author has a strong hunch which
it is. The only reasonably effective way of prohibiting anti-insurance
84 Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65 (1962); Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d
692, 376 P.2d 70 (1962) ; Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
85 While it is true that the Federal Constitution does not guarantee equal pro-
tection to all persons within the state boundaries except guests in automobiles, and
the State Constitution does not add to its prohibition against special privileges and
immunities a saving clause allowing discrimination on the public highways, it is
possible for the apologists to explain this as a sort of legislative oversight. After all,
the automobile had not been invented at the time either constitution was adopted (or
even at the time the fourteenth amendment was added). Undoubtedly the presumption
is that, had the founding fathers known there would be an automobile, they would
have denied equal protection to its occupants and therefore their failure to prohibit
this form of discrimination must be interpreted as approbative. That, at least, is the
only theory which has occurred to the author for the proposition that the Constitution
does not follow the flag as far as the freeway.
86 CA ,. VEH. CODE §§ 16000-503 (West 1955).
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company collusion would be either doing away with rights of action
against insured motorists or prohibiting the issuance of insurance.
Certainly the method adopted to avoid collusion is absolutely the
worst method of achieving that goal: virtually compelling the mo-
torist to be insured. If it is truly a legitimate objective to burn the
barn down to make sure that no insurance company is the victim
of collusion, then the financial responsibility and insurance laws
are utterly repugnant to that objective.
All this, of course, is ridiculous. So is the rationalization of the
statute.
VI. IN OPERATION, THE GUEST STATUTE HAS IMPOSED AN
INTOLERABLE BURDEN ON CALIFORNIA'S JUDICIAL MACHINERY
The mere fact that the guest statute appears lacking in even
the minimal rationality of purpose and effect sufficient to carry it
past constitutional scrutiny should, it seems, be sufficient reason for
either judicial or legislative determination"7 that indeed the Con-
stitution is supreme, even over the guest statute. However, if that
is not sufficiently persuasive, an examination of the actual effect of
the statute in operation over a generation of experience with Cali-
fornia litigation, ought to serve as something of a tie breaker or
makeweight. All theory, principle and philosophy aside, any realistic
appraisal of the statute in operation shows that it has hung more
than one albatross around the neck of an already-strained adjudica-
tive apparatus, including:
1. A gross volume of litigation which is utterly wasteful of
the state's finite resources, both in terms of economic waste
and squandering of judicial time and effort;
2. A demoralizing state of anarchy among the various levels
of the judiciary; and
3. A degrading and corruptive picture of capricious, erratic
and inconsistent legal gamesmanship.
The California experience has proved correct Dean Prosser's
dyspeptic observation: "There is perhaps no other group of statutes
which have filled the courts with appeals on so many knotty little
problems involving petty and otherwise entirely inconsequential
points of law."8 "
87 Or preferably that determination by both.
88 W. PROSSER, TORTS § 34, at 191 (3d ed. 1964).
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A. The Statute Has Produced an Avalanche of Litigation
So far as the writer has been able to ascertain, 9 the guest
statute has played a pivotal role 90 in the decision of 201 appeals
since its adoption.
According to the latest report of the California Judicial Council,
the average number of civil dispositions per California appellate
justice is approximately 43 per year.9 In other words, the state has
expended five judge-years on working out the knotty, inconsequen-
tial little problems attendant upon stamping out ingratitude and
burning down the barn to prevent collusion. This is not only a human
and intellectual extravagance but also a considerable economic
waste.92 If the ratio of approximately 125 civil dispositions by the
superior courts to every appellate civil disposition9" holds true in
the area of Guest Act litigation, it may be assumed that the superior
courts have been required to dispose of some 25,000 Guest Act cases
to date. The manpower and economic expenditure inherent in that
figure is staggering. (Of course, presumably a substantial number
of those cases would have required judicial disposition, anyway, but
common sense suggests that absent the special exemption inherent
in the guest statute-and the legal and factual problems that ex-
emption creates-a major number of those cases would have been
settled and those tried would have consumed considerably less time
and energy.)
That gross volume of business, it is submitted, constitutes no
minor expenditure of public effort and finance, all to the supposed
object of making sure that sufficient gratitude is felt for a free ride
and/or of providing yet another advance guarantee against the per-
89 Vagaries of indexing, citation and the like in this incessantly-involved statute
render it impossible to assert didactically the accuracy of any figure. If there is a
discrepancy in number, it is small, however.
90 To some extent a subjective distinction must be made here. In many cases,
the interpretation or application of the statute obviously controlled the appeal and
therefore the cases are included, while in a large number of excluded cases the statute
was mentioned only by analogy, background information or the like and was not
involved in any way in the issue on appeal. In a number of cases, however, it is
necessary for the reader to interpret the opinion to determine whether the statute was
controlling on the settlement of the issue on appeal (or one of the issues on appeal).
In making this determination, a sort of "but for" test was applied: Would the appeal
have been necessary or the outcome or issues have been different if California had
never adopted a guest statute?
91 1968 ANN. REP. OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE CAL. CT. Table 5.
92 Even in pure dollars, this is no mere bagatelle. The current going rate (based
on the appropriations for new appellate judges) is $77,000 per judge or, as a package
deal, five for $400,000 (curiously enough, they are not cheaper by the almost-half-
dozen). CAL. GOVT. CODE § 69103 (Ch. 894 § 3 Deering 6 Advance Leg. Serv. 1968).
93 1968 ANN. REP. OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE CAL. CT., Tables 5, 12-16.
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petration of criminal fraud. It is, of course, minimal compared to
the harm done to the mass of individual litigants injured by negli-
gent hosts, who must either see their injuries go uncompensated or
else achieve compensation only after running a gauntlet of time,
legal expense and the like. But it is still no small burden to toss
onto the back of an already-groaning judicial system.
The mere fact that a statute produces a great deal of litigation
is not, of itself, a basis for condemning it.94 But when a statute of
such narrow, parochial and bizarre nature as this becomes one of
the central concerns of the legal machinery, it is a matter worth
thinking about.
It is submitted that courts, in California and elsewhere, have
better channels for employing their finite time and energy than in
counting the number of angels dancing on the pinhead of the guest
statute. Rather than wrestling with how "wilful misconduct" is to
be defined for twelve lay jurors (who will probably make their own
arbitrary decision anyway) the appellate courts might better explore
the brewing problems of fair trial versus free press. Instead of
practicing alchemistic analyses as to when dross turns to the gold of
"compensation" or "motivating influence," the courts might better
devote more time and deliberation to the competing interests of
order, stability and public safety vis-A-vis jealous and effective
protection of the rights of the accused when confronted by the
monolithic state. Rather than choreographing an intricate dance as
to when a guest ceases to be a guest, or when a ride ceases to be a
ride or when a ride is on a public highway, the courts might better
define-and enforce-the rights of injured consumers who claim to
have sustained product-inflicted injuries and, for that matter, the
concomitant right of manufacturers and purveyors of the goods
which are essential to an affluent society to be free from oppression
or plundering by spurious or unfounded claims.95
94 After all, the first amendment to the United States Constitution, with its
fundamental guarantees of freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of the
press, freedom of assembly and the right to petition for redress of grievance, is fre-
quently cited also. As a matter of fact, it is cited almost precisely the same number
of times by California courts as is the Guest Act over the years-a fact which is
itself somewhat disturbing when the two provisions are compared.
95 It is not only the judges who have been caused extra, unproductive labor in
this field; the bar has shared. To an extent unparalleled in any other form of appellate
litigation, concerned lawyers have participated as amici curiae in Guest Act litigation-
apparently out of a felt need to assist in improving the state of the law, or perhaps
even more likely, to guard against making it even worse. This has reached a crescendo
in recent years when the mere fact that an appeal involves a citation to the Guest
Act seems to render it de rigeur for both the plaintiff-oriented and defense-oriented
professional societies to marshal their paladins.
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B. The Statute Has Seriously Disrupted the Normal and Necessary
Relationships Among the Different Levels of Courts
Another aspect of the appellate history of the statute is a good
deal more subtle than mere proliferation and gross numbers of
appeals, and at the same time more disquieting. This involves the
apparent reluctance of the lower courts to accede to the leadership
of the higher tribunals.
Despite the central premise of a multi-level judiciary that the
lower courts must follow the lead of the higher, it seems that where
the Guest Act is concerned, the court of appeal is somewhat lacking
in influence over trial court decisions, while at the same time the
supreme court often seems to gain grudging acceptance-at best-
from the intermediate appellate court. Repeatedly, the supreme court
has told the courts of appeal that the Guest Act, as a special exemp-
tion, must be narrowly construed 6 and that liability for fault, rather
than nonliability, must be the rule in questionable cases. In a dis-
tressingly high percentage of cases, the response seems to be: Not
unless a hearing is granted in the supreme court.
Of all the cases in which a hearing has been granted following
the first appellate decision, the supreme court has disagreed with
the court of appeal a staggering twice as often as it has agreed. That,
however, does not tell the entire story; in the smaller number of
cases in which there has been agreement between the two levels of
appellate judiciary, it has existed in cases where the initial decision
was for the injured plaintiff three times as often as where the first
appellate decision favored the defendant. Similiarly, where there has
been disagreement, the supreme court has ruled for the plaintiff as
against a court of appeal ruling for the defendant substantially
more often than the reverse situation has occurred.
As to disagreement between the court of appeal and the
superior courts (without intervention by the supreme court) the
picture is similar. As expected, the trial court is affirmed on appeal
almost three times as often as it is reversed. However, where the
plaintiff prevailed at trial that ratio is increased to three and one-
half to one in favor of affirmances. Where the defendant prevailed
at trial, however, the ratio of affirmances to reversals is reduced to
exactly two to one.
But perhaps the most conspicuous feature of all is the willing-
ness of superior courts to take the case from the jury and render a
96 Williams v. Carr, 68 A.C. 603, 611, 440 P.2d 505, 511 (1968); O'Donnell v.
Mullaney, 66 Cal. 2d 994, 997, 429 P.2d 160, 162 (1967) ; Prager v. Isreal, 15 Cal. 2d
89, 98 P.2d 729 (1940).
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judgment for the defendant on one of the extraordinary or drastic
bases (sustaining a demurrer or granting a nonsuit, directed verdict
or judgment notwithstanding the verdict). Of the appeals from
judgments for the defendant which reach the intermediate appellate
level, more than half were some such extraordinary orders; predict-
ably, only a small fraction withstood appellate review. By contrast,
however, the number of such non-meritorious dispositions which
survived transfer to the supreme court virtually reaches the level
of the statistically minuscule.
Therefore, the picture is that trial judges display an excessive
willingness to invade the jury's province and summarily end the
plaintiff's case, despite abundant evidence of the likelihood that
such action will be held improper; coupled with that, there is the
picture of the intermediate appellate court which is sharply critical
in its review of such drastic orders, but still apparently more in
sympathy with them than with the court of last resort.
In short, the flow of persuasion seems to be precisely reversed
from the course which it should take. Judicial pioneering by the
lower courts in unsettled areas is, of course, a boon to be sought and
cherished, but lower court unwillingness to follow the lead of the
higher courts is nothing but judicial anarchy. It is the antithesis of
our philosophy of judicial administration to create a system in
which a litigant cannot enjoy the benefit of the supreme court's
interpretation of a legal principle without actually reaching the
supreme court. That creates an intolerable burden upon the in-
dividual litigant, but it also creates a practically intolerable strain
on the supreme court if the only way its views can be enforced is
by its substituting itself for the superior courts and the courts of
appeal.
Such a situation is both chaotic and wasteful. A form of legisla-
tion which produces chaos and waste ought to be viewed with a
jaundiced eye.
C. The Statute Has Produced a Crazyquilt of
Indefensible Adjudication
Finally, there is the nature of that which the courts have
wrought. (One should not deal too harshly with them; a hard
pressed appellate court is naturally going to give first priority to
the serious business of the judiciary, relegating such matters fugi-
tive from the debating societies as guest statute problems to spare
time and less-than-careful consideration.) It is a sorry picture which,
of course, is intrinsically disturbing to anyone who believes that the
web of the law, if not seamless, should at least approach the seemly.
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Apart from its intrinsic debits, however, it is submitted that any
area of the law which is characterized by apparently cynical caprice
and gamesmanship must indeed "do sly injury to the law"97 itself.
The law has enemies and enmity enough among the growingly
vocal "know-nothing" fringe without supplying Exhibits A to Z
to serve as examples. Just as the law deserves respect, it must earn
that respect by acting rationally and respectably. It does not in this
field. It plays games.
1. The What-Is-A-Ride Gambit. One of the principal Games
Courts Play is that of taking one word from the statute and gazing
piercingly at it through a microscope darkly.98 For example, there
is the Ride Game in which the problem is to ascertain whether
somebody alighting from an automobile, or with one foot on the
running board, or running to it, or from it, standing in front of the
car cranking it, or what-not is "riding" or in the "throes of a ride." 9
2. Ploy: When Is a Highway a Highway? Another stimulating
game involves the problem of when is a vehicle not on the highway
on the highway. California felt obliged to go through three or four
decades of analogies, agonizing over whether a statute-which ap-
plies only to cars on the highways-applies to cars not on the high-
ways,' but finally decided that, when the legislature said highway
it meant highway. 101
3. The Best Brouhaha: Find The Consideration. The real fun-
and-games, however, arises when the issue is what constitutes "com-
pensation" or a tangible benefit (which, roughly translated, means
passenger status) or conversely what constitutes mere "customary
courtesies of the road," "pleasure of the rider's company" or
"social purpose" (i.e., guest). It would be nice to console the reader
with some thread of rationality but, alas, that is beyond the meager
97 Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do It Justice, 49 CAIlF. L. REV. 615, 621
(1961).
98 The irreverent would say through a kaleidoscope.
99 Boyd v. Cress, 46 Cal. 2d 164, 293 P.2d 37 (1956) ; Prager v. Isreal, 15 Cal.
2d 89, 98 P.2d 729 (1940); Elisalda v. Welch's Sand & Gravel Co., 260 A.C.A. 46,
67 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1968); Smith v. Pope, 53 Cal. App. 2d 43, 127 P.2d 292 (1942);
Harrison v. Gamatero, 52 Cal. App. 2d 178, 125 P.2d 904 (1942); Noreas v. Perry,
135 Cal. App. 202, 26 P.2d 886 (1933).
100 Prager v. Isreal, 15 Cal. 2d 89, 98 P.2d 729 (1940).
101 O'Donnell v. Mullaney, 66 Cal. 2d 994, 429 P.2d 160 (1967). Not without a
battle, however. The intermediate court held that since the legislature had amended
the original statute-which contained no such limitation-to restrict the operation of
the guest statute to vehicles "upon a highway" that certainly must have meant that
the legislature wanted the statute to apply on parking lots, amusement center areas,
private roadways and other non-highway locations. O'Donnell v. Mullaney, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 827 (1967) vacated. Spirited battle, pro and con, was done over the proposition
by whole phalanxes of lawyers before a highway-was discovered to be a highway.
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resources of the writer-just as it seems to lie beyond the consider-
able resources of the courts.
For example, a rider who invited the driver to dinner, agreeing
to pay all of the driver's expenses of the evening (and in fact paying
them) in order to pick the driver's brain concerning divorce prob-
lems, was held to be indulging in mere courtesies of the road. 2
But when two employees decided to go to dinner after work ("dutch
treat"), it was a business function because they planned to discuss
a fashion show which was to occur at their place of business in the
future. 3
Then, too, a trip from Los Angeles to Ensenada and back for
the purpose of enabling driver and rider to enter into the bonds of
holy matrimony was held to be a mere courtesy of the road and
insufficient even to allow an inference of tangible benefit. 4 How-
ever, it was held that assistance with Christmas shopping con-
stituted compensation as a matter of law and beyond argument. 0 5
Similarly there is the problem of staff members in summer
camps. When they rode around in trucks at Camp Lilienthal, they
were receiving a mere gratuity, the "small courtesies that went with
rank". 0 6 While making the circuit on behalf of the San Mateo
Presbytery, however, counselors were enjoying no mere badge of
rank, but rather an inducement to the over-all functioning of the
secular (and presumably religious) operations of the venture. 7
Where plaintiff and defendant were both involved in putting
together a congregation picnic (one of them being unable to speak
English and unfamiliar with the locale) and it was agreed that they
would assist one another in selecting, loading and otherwise obtain-
ing the necessaries for the picnic, this was mere courtesy, since no
money changed hands. 8 On the other hand, the mere possibility
that the rider might give some assistance in moving a student's be-
longings from one "pad" to another was ample to render it a busi-
ness trip. 109
Let us assume a pre-arrangement under which one party binds
himself to perform a specified portion of the driving and further-
102 Stephan v. Proctor, 235 Cal. App. 2d 228, 45 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1965).
108 Tucker v. Landucci, 57 Cal. 2d 762, 371 P.2d 754 (1962).
104 Boykin v. Boykin, 260 A.C.A. 817, 67 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1968).
105 Kruzie v. Sanders, 23 Cal. 2d 237, 143 P.2d 704 (1943).
106 Humphreys v. San Francisco Area Council, 22 Cal. 2d 436, 139 P.2d 941
(1943).
10T7 Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951).
108 Brandis v. Goldanski, 117 Cal. App. 2d 42, 255 P.2d 36 (1953).
109 Neuser v. Britto, 237 Cal. App. 2d 444, 46 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1965)-somewhat
perplexingly citing Brandis v. Goldanski, 117 Cal. App. 2d 42, 255 P.2d 36 (1953).
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more to contribute a calculable proportion of the aggregate expenses
of travel, in the absence of which agreement the whole trip would
never have been made. Is that a contract and a consideration?
Answer: No; this "was in no sense" a mutually advantageous enter-
prise, and "no inference can be drawn" that consideration existed.11 °
Okay, then, how about an agreement by two families who had
been friends for many years, and planned to take a trip to the
Rockies, as to which they had each agreed to contribute equally to
a common fund for gasoline, oil, meals, lodging, and sightseeing.
Obviously, remembering the teaching of the case just discussed,
there would be even less basis for drawing an inference of compen-
sation. Right? Wrong; that not only permitted an inference of
mutual benefit, it compelled that inference as a matter of law!111
Or, there was the plaintiff, "a man very well informed as to
general market conditions, giving considerable attention thereto,
and at times making trips to the City of Oakland, where he gained
further information as to market conditions," '112 and the defendant
who wanted to sell 200 boxes of oranges on that market. Defendant,
a sound businessman, invited plaintiff "to accompany him to Oak-
land and aid him in securing the best available market in which to
sell the oranges."11 Plaintiff agreed, and as the court observed
"everything went well until the parties reached a place on the high-
way known as Dublin canyon"11 4 where the defendant negligently
ran off the road, incinerating his Dodge sedan and bringing the
rider's orange-marketing expertise to no good end. Held-sort of-
that this might or might not be compensation and a business pur-
pose. But, where two employees of the same employer both were re-
quired to attend the same sales meeting, that, ipso facto, constituted
compensation given by one for a ride to the meeting in the vehicle
of the other. 15
110 Ray v. Hanisch, 147 Cal. App. 2d 742, 306 P.2d 30 (1957).
111 Whitmore v. French, 37 Cal. 2d 744, 235 P.2d 3 (1951). By the by, the
Whitmore case, which was decided six years before Ray v. Hanisch, 147 Cal. App. 2d
742, 306 P.2d 30 (1957) was cited by the Ray court in support of its holding, not once
but twice. See § VI. B, supra, for discussion of whether the supreme court has any
influence with the courts of appeal in this field. See the writings of Mr. Lewis Carroll
for a rationale.
112 Haney v. Takakura, 2 Cal. App. 2d 1, 2, 37 P.2d 170, 171 (1934). That case
was cited 34 years later in support of the proposition that traveling to get married
is courtesy of the road, as a matter of law. Boykin v. Boykin, 260 A.C.A. 817, 67
Cal. Rptr. 520 (1968).
113 Haney v. Takakura, 2 Cal. App. 2d 1, 3, 37 P.2d 170, 171 (1934).
114 Id.
115 Thompson v. Lacey, 42 Cal. 2d 443, 267 P.2d 1 (1954). Any lawyer who
has had more than a nodding acquaintance with the field can-undoubtedly supply his
own annotations to this quick skimming.
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CONCLUSION
Admittedly, recent decisions in the field of host-guest litigation
have constituted an attempt to step in the right direction, and a
slight improvement in a field of law which is ripe therefor. It seems
unarguable, however, that it has been an attempt and a step analo-
gous to the great strides forward which improved smog devices have
worked in curing air pollution!116
Three and a half decades of confusion, illogic, solecism, games-
manship-and unconstitutionality-are enough. Every segment of
the legal community knows the true nature and state of the guest
statute; it is time for some court to play the role of the proverbial
small boy and point out the truth to the sovereign-that the legis-
lation is unclothed by constitutionality.
One tends to suspect that somewhere in this great state the
right court is just waiting to be asked in the right way in the right
case.
116 At this juncture, it is perhaps appropriate to point out that the writer is not
currently or potentially involved in any Guest Act litigation. This is a mildly interest-
ing phenomenon in itself (since the nature of the animal makes it rare that an active
practitioner is spared any such involvement), hut it is also mentioned as circumstantial
evidence that the observations collected here are not the product of current advocacy
-although admittedly past familiarity has helped to breed present contempt.
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